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ABSTRACT
Two expert system development projects were stud-
ied to evaluate a proposed Expert Systems Develop-
ment Methodology (ESDM). The ESDM was devel-
oped for use at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC)
to provide guidance to managers and technical per-
sonnel and serve as a standard in the development of
expert systems. It was agreed that the proposed
ESDM must be evaluated before it could be adopted;
therefore a study was planned for its evaluation. This
detailed study is now underway. Before the study
began, however, two ongoing projects were selected
for a retrospective evaluation. They were the Rang-
ing Equipment Diagnostic Expert System (REDEX)
and the Backup Control Mode Analysis and Utility
System (BCAUS). Both projects were approximately
1 year into development. Interviews of project per-
sonnel were conducted, and the resulting data was
used to prepare the retrospective evaluation. Deci-
sion models of the two projects were constructed and
used to evaluate the completeness and accuracy of
key provisions of ESDM. A major conclusion reached
from these case studies is that suitability and risk
analysis should be required for all AI projects, large
and small. Further, the objectives of each stage of
development during a project should be selected to
reduce the next largest area of risk or uncertainty on
the project.
INTRODUCTION
The Expert Systems Development Methodology
(ESDM) is intended to be applied to the development
of expert systems at the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration/Goddard Space Flight Center
(NASA/GSFC). The methodology is based on a sur-
vey of existing methodologies, experience in develop-
mg a number of expert systems at GSFC, and an
analysis of the expert system life cycle. Dr. Barry W.
Boehm introduced a risk-driven methodology for
conventional systems development in his spiral
model for software development (Boehm, 1988).
ESDM, while independently generated, is also a
risk-driven methodology that can be represented by a
spiral model with the focus on knowledge acquisition
as opposed to product development. Figure 1 shows
the spiral model of ESDM.
Risks are inherent in all system development proj-
ects, but they are greater in ES development because
of the uncertainties associated with modeling human
expert decision processes. At the outset of the devel-
opment of an expert system, it is not known whether
an expert's decision processes are cognitive processes
that can be modeled by ES techniques. Some human
decisions are made on the basis of intuition or skills,
which usually cannot be modeled using ES tech-
niques. Intuitive processes and skills can often be
modeled using other techniques, such as neural net-
works, but ESDM does not address these. Even after
it has been determined that an expert's decision proc-
esses can be modeled, there remain developmental
risks because of uncertainties about the robustness
and performance that can be obtained from the
expert system.
ESDM was developed as a tool for both project man-
agers and developers of expert systems in the NASA
environment. It focuses on the knowledge acquisition
task, rather than on product development. Key fea-
tures and recommendations of ESDM include:
• Decomposition of an ES development proj-
ect into stages. In each stage, work is directed
toward the acquisition of the key knowledge
needed to reduce the most immediate or
highest level risk of the project.
• Explicit identification of the objectives of
each stage of work prior to its initiation and
testing to verify that the objectives have been
met.
• Well-defined criteria for stopping ES devel-
opment. Once the functional requirements
of the proposed system have been identified,
ESDM recommends dropping the ES
approach and continuing the project along
the lines of conventional system develop-
ment. ESDM also recommends stopping the
ES project if the expert's decision processes
are not suitable for ES modeling or if an
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Figure 1. Spiral Model of ESDM
algorithm is discovered that performs the
decision process satisfactorily.
• ESDM provides guidance for the kinds of
special documentation needed for ES proj-
ects and the management information that
should be collected for administrative
reporting.
• ESDM recommends using of quantitative
methods for assessing risk where possible
and provides a tool, the Test for Application
of Risk-Oriented Technology (TAROT), to
assist in this evaluation.
The ESDM project has produced a user's guide
(CSCa, 1988), a policy document (CSCb, 1988), and a
reference manual (CSCc, 1988) along with training
materials. ESDM has been proposed for use on all
GSFC expert system projects. Because a proposed
methodology must be evaluated before its adoption,
however, a framework for the evaluation was also
developed (CSC, 1989). The framework recom-
mended selecting an expert system development
project and using it as a pilot to evaluate the features
of the ESDM before its adoption as a standard. The
project would be followed from beginning to end and
would collect data on ESDM effectiveness.
Before undertaking a full-scale pilot study, two on-
going projects were selected for a retrospective eval-
uation of ESDM. The Ranging Equipment Diagnos-
tic Expert System (REDEX) and the Backup Control
Mode Analysis and Utility Systems (BCAUS) were
the two projects selected. Data on the two projects
was collected by interviewing project personnel. De-
cision models of the two projects were also con-
structed and used to evaluate the completeness and
accuracy of ESDM in accordance with the general
provisions of the framework for evaluation.
This paper presents a summary of the findings made
on these two case studies. The case studies include a
description of the two projects, the key decisions
made on the projects, and conclusions reached about
the methodology.
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THE REDEX SYSTEM
REDEX is an advanced prototype expert system that
diagnoses hardware failures in the ranging equip-
ment (RE) at NASP_s Ground Network tracking sta-
tions (Luczak, 1989). REDEX is intended for use by
RE technicians in identifying faulty circuit cards or
modules that must be replaced. The system has a
highly graphical user interface that uses color block
and layout diagrams to illustrate fault locations.
Figure 2 shows the environment for REDEX.
The REDEX project was initiated by the Telecommu-
nication Systems Branch (Code 531) at GSFC as a
task assignment. There were two persons assigned to
the project initially, but the level of effort has
averaged less than two full-time persons.
No formal risk or suitability analysis of the project was
performed. The use of an expert system as a diagnos-
tic aid for the RE was considered feasible because the
RE had been designed with a large number of built-in
test points. It was expected that these test points
would greatly facilitate the automation of fault diag-
nosis, and the task of REDEX was to speed up the
identification process.
Development staff personnel were generally familiar
with the provisions of ESDM. On their own initiative,
they selected ESDM features that they believed
would assist them in the development of REDEX and
used them in the project. The selected features were:
• The use of a staged development
• The decomposition of stages into steps
• The use of risk analysis to guide the selection
of objectives for stages
The stages of work on REDEX followed ESDM rec-
ommendations closely for addressing successively
more complex objectives. Five stages of work were
defined, each addressing more complex issues. The
following summarizes these five stages:
1. Feasibility of implementing one diagnostic
rule and accomplishing diagnosis with this
rule
2. Feasibility of extending the feasibility proto-
type to include all relevant rules on the
selected hardware host (IBM PC-AT)
3. Feasibility of implementing one graphics
screen on the selected host
4. Feasibility of extending the graphics system
to include all required graphics
5. The capability of the system to be fielded
(field prototype), including handling all
necessary communications with the equip-
ment
REDEX is implemented in Prolog on an IBM PC
AT-compatible workstation. A semantic network
knowledge representation technique was used to
model the design structure of the RE. A catalog of
generic troubleshooting rules was compiled to repre-
sent heuristics that are applied in diagnosis. Specific
troubleshooting rules unique to the RE were also
added. Over 50 generic and 250 specific rules were
developed. A hypertext-like scheme is used to allow
the user to navigate through the diagrams and tables.
Over 50 graphic and tabular displays have been
implemented.
9-METER
S-BAND ANTENNA
EXCITERS RANGING TRACKING
DATA
AND EQUIPMENT PROCESSORRECEIVERS
NASA
COMMUNICATIONS
NETWORK
Figure 2. NASA Ground Network Tracking Station
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The client identified the use of IBM PC-AT hardware
as desirable at the outset of the project. The choice of
computer language or shell development system was
left to project personnel, but an early identification of
the language was requested for budgetary estimation.
At project initiation, it was not clear what knowledge
representation scheme might be most appropriate for
the knowledge yet to be acquired, and project person-
nel began addressing this problem immediately.
After investigation, they determined that a rules
representation would be appropriate. Generic and
specific rules (in a pseudocode form) for the system
were manually compiled.
From the somewhat limited choices available for the
implementation of knowledge-based systems on an
IBM PC-AT, project personnel concluded, after fur-
ther investigation of six languages and shell develop-
ment systems, that Prolog appeared to be suitable for
prototyping the rules. A feasibility prototype was then
developed to test whether Prolog was suitable for the
system prototypes. (Prolog's suitability for the opera-
tional system was not determined at this time; how-
ever, its suitability in this regard has since been
proved.) At the completion of the second prototype
stage, called the research stage in ESDM, the func-
tional requirements for REDEX were validated.
These requirements were then documented and
issued in a functional requirements document.
The fifth (and current) prototype stage of REDEX
addresses those risks associated with using the system
in the field. In this prototype, the uncertainties are
concerned with the communications between the RE
and REDEX. This system is currently being
evaluated in a communications emulation testbed
and will be connected to the RE after evaluation.
THE BCAUS SYSTEM
BCAUS is an expert system designed to assist flight
operations personnel in diagnosing the cause of a
Gamma Ray Observatory (GRO) spacecraft autono-
mous mode transition (Bush, 1989). The GRO space-
craft was designed with onboard capability to safe
itself autonomously, transitioning from a primary op-
erating mode to a backup control (safing) mode in the
event of certain error conditions in the attitude con-
trol and determination (ACAD) subsystem.
Flight operations personnel need to understand what
error condition trigger the onboard computer (OBC)
to order the mode transition and why that error con-
dition occurred so that they may take the proper cor-
rective action. The OBC was not designed, however,
to provide the triggering information or the diag-
nostic information to the operator.
Input information to BCAUS will be provided by
telemetry data from GRO and by user input. Output
from BCAUS will be provided only to the diagnosti-
cian. There is no output back to the spacecraft.
Figure 3 shows a diagram of the information flows in
BCAUS.
GSFC also initiated the BCAUS project by issuing a
task assignment. Two persons were assigned to the
project. No formal risk or suitability analysis of
BCAUS was performed. Task personnel had knowl-
edge of the risk areas in expert system development
and used this information to guide the development
process. The primary area of risk for BCAUS was in
the knowledge acquisition process. Four sources of
expertise were identified and were initially consid-
ered adequate for the development task. These four
sources were (1)documentation, (2)GSFC space-
craft design experts, (3)GSFC flight operations
experts, and (4) TRW personnel associated with the
design of the relevant GRO subsystems. However,
project personnel found that the knowledge acquisi-
tion task for this system was more difficult than ini-
tially thought and that the initial evaluation of risk
had to be modified. The project goals have therefore
shifted from providing an operational system to a
system in which the knowledge base is easily modified
and updated on the basis of actual experience. In
brief, the goal has shifted from providing an initially
operational system to an adaptive system with an
initial base of knowledge that can be upgraded as
expertise is acquired.
The difficulty in the knowledge acquisition task for
the BCAUS project is that the expertise needed to
diagnose GRO mode transitions has not yet been
acquired by humans. There was no training course
available for GRO fault diagnosis as there was for
REDEX. The existence of a training course means
that the diagnostic knowledge has been compiled,
thus implying a lower risk of system development.
However, even the designers of the GRO subsystems
had not yet acquired or compiled all the information
necessary for mode transition analysis, and this fact
was not known at the outset of the project. The rela-
tive inaccessibility of the TRW design engineers
because of their location on the west coast and their
limited availability for consultation made it difficult
for project personnel to elicit any available informa-
tion. When the full difficulty of knowledge acquisi-
tion became known, a reevaluation and reorientation
of project goals and objectives became necessary. The
complexity of the knowledge acquisition task on the
BCAUS project perhaps doubled the time required
to reach a feasibility prototype. This situation con-
strained the design of the operational system in ways
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Figure 3. The BCAUS System
that were not and probably could not have been,
determined at the outset.
The first prototype system, a feasibility prototype, was
implemented on a PC-386 class machine using the
KES hypothesize-and-test (liT) inference engine
developed by Software Architecture and Engi-
neering, Inc. Basic structural knowledge of the sys-
tem elements was loaded on the machine in three
weeks by two persons. No rules were needed because
of the built-in diagnostic feature of ICES HE. When
KES HT was selected initially, there were some
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known limitations on its capabilities. Following its use
on the project, it became clear that the limitations
were too restrictive, especially in the area of explana-
tory power. The second prototyping system selected
was ART-IM, an expert system development shell
produced by Inference Corporation, which can run on
both the 386 machine and a Silicon Graphics Iris
4D/20. The Iris has considerably more power for
graphics than the 386 machine.
The BCAUS system will also have a neural network
front end to provide trending data on input telemetry
signals. Project personnel determined that it might be
possible to implement trending analysis using
ART-IM rules, but at the expense of making the sys-
tem much larger and more complex than desirable.
The software product, Neural Works Professional II,
from Neural Ware, Inc., was selected to implement
the trending analysis.
The BCAUS system's graphics interface shows rele-
vant subsystems in the form of functional block dia-
grams, similar to those implemented in REDEX,
with highlighted potential problem areas. A hierar-
chical traverse is planned for navigation of the dia-
grams and causal graphs.
As was the case with REDEX, there was a strong
tendency to follow the methodology used for conven-
tional software systems, and the hardware and soft-
ware selections were set very early in the project. The
deadlines for hardware and software selection were
met only through very concentrated effort on the part
of the project's development staff.
PROJECT KEY DECISIONS
In the evaluation process, ESDM was modeled as a
sequence of key decisions plus subsidiary decisions.
Key decisions are identified on the basis of their pos-
sible impacts on project cost and schedule. The key
decisions of ESDM are:
• Start. The decision that the project is suit-
able for implementation by an expert system
is based on a formal suitability analysis in
ESDM.
• Knowledge-oriented approach. Is current
knowledge about the problem sufficient to
permit preparation of specifications for the
system now? If not, then a knowledge-
oriented approach is indicated, that is, the
decision is made to acquire the missing infor-
mation first.
• Staffing. ESDM recommends a knowledge
engineer, AI programmers, system program-
mers, and domain experts for expert system
projects.
• Staging. ESDM recommends dividing a proj-
ect into successive stages based on the
degree of uncertainty about how to accom-
plish the function or service.
• Steps within stages. ESDM recommendsfol-
lowing five steps within each stage. These
steps focus on identifying the knowledge to
be acquired within the stage, on acquiring
this knowledge, and on verifying the correct-
ness of the acquired knowledge.
• Explicit risk evaluation. ESDM recommends
that all risk evaluation be explicit, that is,
that each area of risk on the project be docu-
mented and assessed. ESDM also provides a
formal tool, the TAROT metric, to assist in
estimating of risks.
• Stop-rule. This decision is based on acquiring
sufficient information to prepare meaning-
ful and realizable specifications. At this
point, ESDM recommends continuing the
project as a normal software development
project following the conventional software
development life cycle.
There are also technical and managerial decisions of
lesser importance that have some bearing on project
schedule and costs:
• Reporting (frequency, type, content)
• Hardware and software tools selection and
timing
• Use of automated knowledge tools
• Need for graphics and interfaces
The method used to evaluate ESDM was, first, rating
how closely the circumstances and decisions of the
two projects matched the provisions of ESDM and,
second, assessing the worth of the provisions based on
the experience gained on the projects.
The start decision on both REDEX and BCAUS, that
is, the decision to use an expert system or knowledge-
based technology to develop a system was made by
GSFC personnel, not by the development project
personnel. There is no information on whether any
formal analysis of suitability was made by GSFC per-
sonnel. In retrospect, it is clear that both projects
were, in fact, suitable. By now, the usefulness of
expert systems for fault diagnosis has been well estab-
lished; this fact can be considered generally well
known in the computer field.
The ESDM provision that recommends a suitability
analysis for each new project should be amended to
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take into account current practices, informal stan-
dards, and common knowledge among practitioners
in the computer field. The study concluded that a
more formal analysis of suitability should still be per-
formed for any system that does not fall into one of
the familiar categories of expert system applications.
The decision regarding a formal suitability analysis on
any new project is a judgment call. Nevertheless,
ESDM must continued to provide the guidelines and
procedures for cases requiring a suitability analysis.
It was apparent even from a casual analysis of both
REDEX and BCAUS that it was impossible to pre-
pare specifications at the outset for either project and
that a knowledge acquisition process would be
required. What is important, however, is that knowl-
edge acquisition procedures are required and that
identifying the missing pieces of information is neces-
sary in order to develop the systems. The identifica-
tion of this information was carried out on both
projects.
Both the REDEX and BECAUS projects were
staffed with experienced AI professionals. ESDM
guidelines call for both knowledge engineers and AI
programmers. Because of the small size of the proj-
ects, however, it was necessary for project personnel
to function both as knowledge engineers and as AI
programmers. Also, project personnel assumed some
of the functions of domain experts ESDM should be
modified to take the special requirements of small
projects into account, but the need for experienced
and competent staff personnel becomes even more
acute for these smaller projects. Managers should
remain aware of the staffing requirement differences
in small and large projects.
Both REDEX and BCAUS were decomposed into
successive stages of work. ESDM recommends defin-
ing stages in terms of risk and addressing areas of
highest risk first. While there was no conscious deci-
sion to follow ESDM provisions on selecting stages,
REDEX personnel nevertheless followed the feasi-
bility, research, and field stages quite faithfully.
REDEX also decomposed the planned system into
three subsystems (functional, user interface, and
communications interface) and followed the risk-
reduction sequencing in each subsystem. Staging was
also followed on BCAUS. The first year of work on
BCAUS was considered to be the feasibility stage.
ESDM defines the research stage as that stage of work
that establishes that one or a small set of rules can be
implemented. The issue to be addressed then is
whether enough of the required rules can be imple-
mented to make the system practical. A better name
for this stage should reflect the intent of the stage,
that is, determining how far the feasibility prototype
can be extended. The name, extensibility stage, has
been suggested as a replacement.
Both projects followed some natural sequence of
work within the stages that was similar to the steps
described in ESDM. In fact, the steps within the
stages recommended in ESDM are a paraphrase of
the scientific method, which is the model for knowl-
edge acquisition or discovery processes.
There was no formal analysis of risks made on either
REDEX or BCAUS; however, both development
teams reported being acutely aware of the risks asso-
ciated with different areas of their projects at all
times and stated that their work was governed by this
awareness. This awareness of risk characterizes the
experience of the development teams. Less experi-
enced personnel might not have the opportunity to
put together workable and useful systems.
On small projects, there is less need for formal analy-
sis of risk. The lack of a formal analysis on small
projects should not be a concern to managers, as long
as the staff is aware of risks and is guided by their
consideration. On large projects, the use of a formal
risk analysis is still recommended. ESDM provisions
are being modified to take the size of the project into
account.
There are no plans to transfer REDEX or BCAUS to
a conventional development cycle after preparation
of system requirements. On small NASA projects,
the personnel who began the project will typically
carry on the development even after requirements
have been specified and risks reduced to an accept-
able levels. Transfer to a conventional life cycle with a
new development team, which was recommended in
ESDM for large projects, will probably be the excep-
tion, rather than the rule, for most small projects.
The documentation prepared on the two projects
tended to follow the requirements for conventional
software development. Although it is impossible to
draw conclusions about ESDM provisions for docu-
mentation, project personnel felt that the knowledge
acquisition process was not adequately documented
by the normal system development documents, thus
lending support to the ESDM provisions. Some
adjustment for the number of documents recom-
mended by ESDM should be made on the basis of
project size.
Similar to the typical requirements associated with
conventional software engineering, the hardware and
software tools to be used on a project must be speci-
fied at the outset or as early as possible. Based on the
two retrospective studies, the conclusion is that
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ESDM provisions are the least risky, that is, delaying
the selection of hardware and software tools until
after identification of the knowledge structure.
Because of the experiences gained by project person-
nel on REDEX and BCAUS, they suggested the pos-
sibility of using automated tools for logging and man-
aging lists of rules or other knowledge structures.
Since the final evaluation is incomplete at this time,
there has been no change in ESDM regarding recom-
mendations on the use of automated tools.
In addition to the two projects described in this study,
there was a review of a number of other expert sys-
tems prepared for NASA. Nearly all of them made
use of color graphics interfaces for presentation of
information to the users. This fact has some implica-
tions for the selection of tools for the development of
expert systems and the selection of personnel to work
on expert systems. A poss_le modification to ESDM
will point this out and provide guidelines for tool and
personnel selection.
REDEX makes use of input data from equipment
monitoring points and BCAUS has telemetry inputs
from the GRO spacecraft. Many NASA expert sys-
tems have sources of input information other than
the human. Also, many make use of other techniques
than logic programming, such as:
• Neural networks
• Procedural code
• Operating system calls
The staffing requirements provisions of ESDM that
address only knowledge engineering and AI program-
ming should be modified to take into account the
possible needs for systems programming, neural net
programming, and familiarity with telemetry and
communications.
CONCLUSIONS
The two projects surveyed match the model of the
expert system development life cycle so closely that
the experience gamed on these projects provides
valuable information for ESDM evaluation. The two
projects are quite different in detail and dynamics,
and they differ from the expected large-size project
envisioned by ESDM. The experience of these proj-
ects is useful primarily in providing ESDM with
extensions to cover the cases of small-size projects.
General conclusions reached from the retrospective
study of the two projects include:
• Confirmation of the need for a methodology.
The standard systems development method-
ology matches the life cycle of expert systems
poorly. The need for a methodology better
suited to the special requirements of expert
systems is supported by project experience.
• Support for the use of a risk-based approach.
Both project teams reported that they were
aware of risks in development and organized
their projects to address these risks. ESDM
formalizes this practice in ES development.
• The decomposition of projects into succes-
sive stages. Both projects broke the work
down into successive stages to make the
overall task more manageable.
• Requirements as an overall goal. Both proj-
ects produced requirements documents at
the conclusion of an extensive knowledge
acquisition phase in accordance with the rec-
ommendations of ESDM.
Based on the evaluations provided by the two proj-
ects, REDEX and BCAUS, it was possible to reach
some specific conclusions about the details of ESDM
and the framework to be used for its evaluation on the
two pilot projects.
• ESDM currently requires a formal suitability
analysis for all projects. Findings suggest
that this requirement should be relaxed for
small projects.
• ESDM should be modified to describe the
differences between small and large proj-
ects. In particular, some of the formal docu-
ments required for projects are unnecessary
for small projects and may impose an unnec-
essary burden.
• The name of the research stage of the
ESDM life cycle should be changed to the
cxtensibility stage.
• The use of the TAROT metric (or other for-
mal tool) for evaluation of risk and the suit-
ability of candidate projects for ESDM
should be optional for small projects.
• Personnel qualifications for expert systems
development should include experience and
familiarity with graphics user interfaces as
well as with the functional tools required for
expert systems.
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